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cy, he had rescinded the loan in a
letter from his attorney to MidPenn. Mid-Penn claimed that its
president had replied to the letter,
stating that the rescission was not
valid.
The Bankruptcy Court's Ruling
Under the TILA and its regulations, insurance premiums written
in connection with consumer loan
transactions normally must be included in the finance charges rather than in the principal. 15 U.S.C §
1605(c) (1988); 12 C.F.R. §
226.4(d)(2) (1990). In the present
case, Mid-Penn excluded the insurance premiums from the finance
charge. Thus, Mid-Penn was required to inform the Debtor of his
right to choose which insurance
company insured his home. MidPenn alleged that the TILA only
required disclosure if the insurance
was purchased "by or through" a
creditor. Mid-Penn claimed that it
did not have to disclose to the
Debtor this right to choose an
insurer, as Mid-Penn merely renewed the Debtor's policy.
The bankruptcy court rejected
Mid-Penn's allegation. Although
Mid-Penn initially did attempt to
renew the Debtor's expired policy,
Mid-Penn ultimately obtained the
insurance from a company of its
own choice. Moreover, the court
found that the applicability of the
disclosure requirement did not depend on whether the insurance was
purchased "from or through" the
creditor. Instead, TILA requires
that the right to choose an insurance company always must be disclosed to the borrower if the premium is excluded from the finance
charge.
Furthermore, the court held that
the disclosure must be in the TILA
statement itself rather than communicated orally or through other
documents. Because the TILA
statement given to the Debtor did
not contain this disclosure, the
court found that Mid-Penn's actions constituted a violation of the
TILA, albeit a technical one made
in good faith. The technical nature
of the TILA violation and the good
faith intentions of the creditor,
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however, were irrelevant. The
court stated that subsequent to the
simplification of TILA in 1980, all
violations which remain viable under the amended TILA, even if
technical, entitle the Debtor to full
remedies provided by the law. In re
Brown, 106 B.R. 852, 853, 856-857
(Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1989).
The court held that this material
violation of the TILA permitted
the Debtor to rescind the loan.
Mid-Penn's improper response to
the rescission allowed the Debtor
to recover statutory damages and
recoupment in the same amount,
relieved him of liability for the
finance charge and eliminated
Mid-Penn's security interest.
The court held that the Debtor
was obligated to repay only the
amount he actually received from
Mid-Penn. Further, the Debtor
could credit his recoupment and
previous payments against this
amount. Therefore, because the
court calculated that the sum of the
recoupment and the payments already made was greater than the
obligation, it offset Mid-Penn's
claim entirely. The court also
awarded the Debtor attorneys' fees
and costs.
Suzi Guemmer

PUBLIC UTILITIES'
RECOUPMENT OF
CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS
THROUGH RATE
STRUCTURE VIOLATES
THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
In Cahill v. Public Serv. Comm.,
76 N.Y.2d 102, 556 N.Y.S.2d 840
(N.Y. 1990), the New York Court
of Appeals held that a public service commission's policy of allowing utilities to pass along the cost of
corporate charitable contributions
to ratepayers violated the ratepayers' first amendment rights. The
policy violated the ratepayers' first
amendment rights because it com-

pelled the ratepayers to contribute
financially to the charitable organizations and identified the ratepayers with the causes supported by
the organizations. The court rejected the utilities' argument that the
compelled recoupment of charitable contributions from ratepayers
was analogous to the government's
use of tax money for purposes that
some taxpayers find objectionable.
The court explained that while the
government has the authority to
use tax money for purposes that
taxpayers find objectionable, it
cannot delegate its authority to tax
to publicly regulated enterprises.
Background
The New York Public Service
Commission ("PSC") is a state
agency which has total regulatory
and rate-fixing authority over public utilities in New York. Prior to
1970, the PSC prohibited utilities
in New York from recouping corporate charitable contributions
from ratepayers. As a result, the
utilities and their shareholders absorbed these costs.
In 1970, the PSC reversed its
policy and permitted the utilities
to pass along the costs of charitable
contributions to ratepayers. The
individual utilities treated the contributions as utility operating expenses and incorporated these
costs into the utility's rate structure. In accordance with the new
rules, New York Telephone ("NY
Tel") and Rochester Gas and Electric ("RG & E") sought to recoup
from their ratepayers charitable
expenditures made to political, religious and other organizations.
Joseph Cahill ("Cahill"), a customer of NYTel, brought an Article 78 proceeding against PSC and
the utilities, contending that the
charitable contribution recoupment policy violated his first
amendment right to free speech
and association. Cahill argued that
the policy compelled him to fund
and to affiliate with organizations
espousing political, religious and
moral beliefs contrary to his own.
Additionally, Cahill objected to
the fact that the utilities decided
(continued on page 30)
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(continued from page 29)
which organizations to support
without consulting ratepayers.

On behalf of all ratepayers, the
Attorney General of New York
also brought an Article 78 proceeding against the PSC and the utilities. The Attorney General advanced the same arguments as
Cahill and, through the Article 78
proceeding, sought to prohibit further use of the charitable contribution recoupment policy. The Attorney General's action was
consolidated with Cahill's.
At the outset of the litigation,
the N.Y. Court of Appeals concluded that the PSC policy constituted state action and thus merited
consideration on constitutional
grounds. The New York Supreme
Court and the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, the lower courts, held that the PSC policy
violated a ratepayer's first amendment right to free speech and association.
The First Amendment
In analyzing Cahill's first
amendment claim, the New York
Court of Appeals noted that the
first amendment protected a citizen from governmental interference with the citizen's right to
speak and to associate freely and
the citizen's right to refrain from
speech and association. Second,
the court emphasized that the
court would uphold a state's interference with first amendment freedoms only upon a showing of a
compelling state interest.
In interpreting the compelling
state interest test, the court relied
on the standard articulated in
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209 (1977). In Abood, the
United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
state statute compelling non-union
employees to pay a fee to the union
in an amount equal to union dues.
The Court concluded that to the
extent that the non-union members' fees were used to support
collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjust-
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ment which advanced labor peace
and Congressional labor relations
policy, the compelled payments
permissibly infringed on the employees' rights of association.
However, the Court emphasized
that it was unconstitutional to extract fees from non-union members for political and ideological
purposes not germane to the Congressional labor relations policy.
Ratepayers Are Personally
Identified
The utilities contended that because the ratepayer would never be
personally identified with the organizations to which the utilities donated funds, the first amendment
freedoms of speech and association
did not apply.
The court found that the first
amendment protected ratepayers
against forced financial support of
causes that they found personally
distasteful; the amendment thus
protected individuals from affirming or acquiescing in beliefs contrary to their own. The court noted
that although the ratepayers'
forced charitable payments were
small, the payments were nevertheless direct support for charitable
organizations. The court concluded that it did not matter whether
the ratepayers were in fact identified as supporters of the organizations but rather that they subjectively believed they were
supporting offensive causes. Thus,
the court held that although the
amount of contribution charged to
a ratepayer would be monetarily
insignificant, the charge violated a
ratepayer's first amendment rights
by serving as an endorsement of
beliefs opposed to those of the
ratepayer.
No Compelling State Interest
As an alternative argument, the
utilities asserted that even if Cahill's claim involved first amendment rights, the intrusion on those
rights was slight. Because the intrusion was germane to some identified state interest, something less
than a compelling state interest
would be sufficient to sustain the
intrusion. The utilities also argued

that the PSC policy was constitutional because the recoupment of
charitable contributions was germane to the reasonable cost of
doing business and to the provision of utility services. The contributions were germane to the provision of utility services because
certain communities inhabited by
ratepayers would benefit from the
donations.
The court rejected this analysis,
finding that Abood had not substituted a "germaneness" test for the
compelling state interest test but
had incorporated it as part of the
compelling state interest test. The
court explained that in Abood, the
Supreme Court first considered
whether there was a compelling
state interest and then examined
whether the state's intrusion was
germane to that interest. In this
case, the state's interest was to
ensure that ratepayers received vital utility services at a reasonable
cost. The court acknowledged that
ratepayers might benefit in some
intangible way from the utilities'
charitable contributions. However,
the court found that the charitable
contribution recoupment policy
was too attenuated from the provision of utility services. In fact, the
court stated that the policy primarily furthered the private interests
of the utilities and their shareholders. Thus, the court held that the
utilities failed to provide a sufficient reason to justify compromising the freedoms guaranteed by the
first amendment.
Taxing Analogy
Finally, the utilities argued that
there was no discernable distinction between coercing ratepayers
to fund the utilities' charitable
contributions and requiring taxpayers to support objectionable
government programs. The court
rejected this argument. The court
reasoned that while the government had the constitutional authority to tax and to provide benefits that some taxpayers found
offensive, it could not delegate this
authority to publicly regulated enterprises. The court explained that
government channeling of public
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expression through preferred
agents with mini-taxing authority
would destroy the free expression
of ideas. Such channeling would
replace the marketplace of ideas
with corporate utility ideas subsidized with consumer funds. Thus,
the court affirmed the order of the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division.
Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Judge
Titone stated that the challenged
practice represented governmental
acquiescence in private economic
decision making and did not rise to
the level of state action. However,
in accepting the "law of the case"
that state action was involved,
Judge Titone concluded that the
charitable contribution recoupment policy violated the ratepayers' constitutional rights, but not
those guaranteed by the first
amendment.
Judge Titone first reviewed the
majority's analysis of Abood. He
noted that Abood stood for the
proposition that if a state impinged
on first amendment rights, it must
have a compelling interest and
narrowly draft the law to meet its
identified interest. He stated that
unlike the union dues policy in
Abood, the PSC policy did not
implicate or impair the ratepayers'
association rights in any manner.
The concurrence maintained that
in Abood the issue was whether
non-union members could be
forced to pay union dues and thus
be forced to associate with the
union against their will. The concurrence explained that in Abood a
non-union member was forced to
associate with the union by virtue
of her payments to the union and
the union's reciprocal duty to represent her. In contrast, Judge Titone noted that the utilities' rates
did not infringe on Cahill's and
other ratepayers' rights of association. The ratepayers freely associated with the utilities and merely
paid for services received; no compulsory association arose from the
ratepayers' payments of utility
bills. Therefore, Judge Titone refused to apply Abood to Cahill's
claim.
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PSC Policy Constituted Taxation
Without Representation

For the concurrence, the dispositive issue was whether the Constitution prohibited the government
from taxing indirectly through private business entities. The concurrence disagreed with the majority's
objection to the government channeling expression through preferred agents, noting that the government did this whenever it
allowed a tax deduction or credit
for private charitable contributions. Therefore, the problem with
the regulatory scheme was not that
it delegated the spending of taxable
funds to a private entity but rather
that the scheme delegated the power to impose a tax. The concurrence explained that the levy in
this case was impermissible. Tax
levies for the welfare of the entire
community were only permissible
if implemented directly by the government because only the government was directly accountable to
taxpayers through the ballot box.
Thus, Judge Titone concluded that
the delegation of general taxing
authority through the PSC policy
was unconstitutional. The policy
constituted taxation without representation rather than a violation of
the first amendment.
Jonathan E. Barrish

CONNECTICUT
CONSUMERS
PROTECTED AGAINST
DECEPTIVELY
ADVERTISED
MANUFACTURER'S
REBATES
The Connecticut Supreme
Court upheld a regulation restricting net price advertising in Caldor
v. Heslin, 215 Conn. 590, 577 A.2d
1009 (1990). Net price advertising
occurs when a retailer advertises a
product for a price that is the final
price the consumer pays after redeeming the rebate from the manufacturer. The Connecticut Su-

preme Court found such
advertising inherently misleading
to consumers and therefore, not
constitutionally protected.
Background
The dispute arose from a regulation promulgated under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act ("CUTPA"), Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 42-11Ob(a) (1987). CUTPA prohibits deceptive practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce.
In § 42-1 10b(c) of CUTPA, the
Connecticut legislature authorized
the Connecticut Consumer Protection Agency ("CPA") to promulgate regulations addressing unfair
or deceptive business practices.
However, the CPA authority was
limited by § 42-1 10b(c) of CUTPA;
no CPA regulation could be inconsistent with the rules and decisions
of federal authorities in their interpretation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
The CPA promulgated a regulation which provides that net price
advertising constitutes an unfair
and deceptive practice unless the
retailer provides the manufacturer's rebate price to the consumer at
the time of purchase. Conn. Agencies Regs. § 42-110b-19 (1988).
The regulation also provides that if
the retailer merely advertises the
availability of a manufacturer's rebate and does not state the net
price of the item, the retailer would
not be expected to pay the rebate
price to the consumer at the time of
purchase.
Caldor, Inc. ("Caldor"), a New
York corporation which operated
retail stores in Connecticut, sued
the CPA. Caldor sought a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the net price advertising restriction.
The Trial Court's Decision
Caldor argued that the CPA regulation exceeded the agency's authority under CUTPA. In addition, Caldor asserted that the net
price advertising restriction was
arbitrary and capricious and thus
violated substantive due process.
Finally, Caldor contended that the
(continued on page 32)
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